INTRODUCTION
A typical GDS implements its IT security capabilities without any knowledge of the system's characteristics and risks. By in large, most of the GDSs use a "cookie cutter" approach for their implementation, for example, a onesize-fits-all firewall and VPN solution to secure its perimeters, to keep attackers outside the GDS system. It is very common to find out islands of credential databases were used in mission operation, to authenticate and authorize users, in which, duplicates of user credential records, inconsistent user profile updates, and negligence of user account decommissions are a few of many problems due to this error-prone design. Lastly, a Secured SHell (SSH) mechanism is used to secure data (a.k.a. transport layer security), however, this does not address threats to data confidentiality and data integrity. The protection of data is one of the essential reasons to keep attackers away from stealing mission critical data and intellectual property [1, 2] .
This paper presents the recent work on the cyber threat risks assessment for an uplink system in a typical MOS. An uplink system usually comprises of mission planning, S/C and ground resource management, sequence and command generation, and command radiation. The results of the risks assessment illustrate the benefits of accounting cyber threat risk assessments to build a dependable and reliable GDS.
II. PURPOSE AND SCOPE
The purpose of this risk assessment task is to identify the vulnerabilities that may exist in a spacecraft's uplink communications and its supporting ground infrastructure services, to determine if those vulnerabilities can be exploited within the current threat environment. This effort will identify the threats capable of exploiting such vulnerabilities, the likelihood of threat occurrence, the resulting mission impact, and the safeguards/countermeasures required to mitigate the risks presented by those vulnerabilities.
III. APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY
The approach for this assessment follows the method put forward by the National Institute of Standards and Technology in its Special Publication 800-30 -"Risk Management Guide Information Technology Systems" [3] .
A. System Characterization
An uplink and commanding system [4, 5] plays a critical role in NASA flight projects, in particular, it provides mission scientists and engineers with science and mission planning, sequencing, command translation, and on-board command execution capabilities, allowing them to successfully plan, command, control, and execute their science and mission objectives. Project scientists use mission and science planning tools to search and analyze science opportunities; the results from these searches will lead them to plan science observations and science experimental activities.
The mission planning and sequencing capabilities include spacecraft and ground constraints checking and resource management. A view of mission plans, resource profiles, and observation targets' image footprints are depicted to scientists for their final confirmation of the science activities that will be performed on the spacecraft (S/C).
Project engineers use sequence and commanding tools to design engineering activities to perform varies activities, for example, S/C telecom subsystem configuration to receive uplink commands and downlink science and engineering data, S/C navigation and guidance and control, and S/C health and safety monitoring.
These science and engineering activities are translated into command sequences and they are verified against a set of spacecraft flight rules and constraints, and resources allocations. Finally, the constraint-free sequences are compiled as onboard programs, to be uplinked and executed onboard.
In Figure 1 , it illustrates an example of a critical uplink path (connection lines in red), which starts with resources scheduling, mission planning, sequence generation, command translation, and command uplink to the S/C. A sample set of mission critical data are also illustrated in Fig. 1 Verified Integrated Sequence viii.
Command Packet File.
B. Threat Identification
Three potential threats are capable of undermining a mission, via an uplink system infrastructure. The threats and vulnerabilities described here are based upon a conceptual uplink system in a reference mission.
• Tampering with S/C commands:
o Create malicious commands that may be sent to the S/C.
• Tampering with mission support data o Use of incorrect input values for mission and science product generation.
• Unauthorized use of uplink system o Create unwanted mission and science products.
C. Vulnerability Identification
In general, cyber attackers spend most of the time to collect data from a target system. Attackers follow an attack vector, which is a path to hack into a target system, using various cyber attack tools. Their goal is to find the vulnerabilities in target system (weakest link) from attack vector, to penetrate the target system and launch their attacks.
The following example illustrates use of attack vector to identify an uplink system's vulnerabilities:
• Bypass Perimeter: Another set of uplink system vulnerabilities can be observed by actual mission operation. For examples: 1) Malicious commands created, undetected, and executed onboard; 2) Malicious commands created but detected and recovered; 3) Malicious mission support used to generate uplink products; 4) Uplink software was used to generate unwanted uplink products.
D. Control Analysis
In order to prevent and mitigate a myriad cyber security risks. The Multi-Mission Ground Systems and Services organization in Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) has started to implement common security services, to countermeasure the potential cyber threats to NASA deep space missions [6] . The services will be a centralized and configurable to a mission without individually implemented by each project. Examples of the common security services are: 4. Inter-centers Federated Security Service [7] a) Strengthen "attacker bypass perimeter" and "establish presence" positions in the attack vector. b) Cross-domain authentication and authorization mechanisms to support sharing of services.
E. Likelihood Determination
The likelihood that a potential vulnerability could be exercised by a given threat-source can be described as high, medium, or low. The standard DREAD model [8] is a collection of five key areas that are used to assess both the likelihood of attack and the mission impact:
1. Reproduce-ability 2. Exploitability 3. Discoverability 4. Damage potential,
Affected entity
Each threat is given a score (3, 2, or 1) for each of the attributes: Tables 1-1, 1-2, and 1-3 illustrate the outcome of likelihood determination of attack to an uplink system. The mission impact assessment will be discussed in the next section (F. Impact Analysis).
To derive an overall likelihood rating that indicates the probability that a potential vulnerability may be exercised within the construct of the associated threat environment, the following governing factors must be considered: Threat-source motivation and capabilities; Nature of the vulnerability; Existence and effectiveness of current controls. High (3) Medium (2) Low (1) Reproduceability
Attacker randomly edits the S/C command file.
Attacks with perfect timing in the uplink process and in-depth knowledge with S/C commands.
Exploitability
Attacker understands of uplink and assembly programming skill, to retrieve the right file type.
A skillful attacker with indepth domain knowledge in uplink operation process, ground data system, and DSN, in order to achieve this attack.
Discoverability
Access to specific command sequences at the right time, with the matching meta data, and in the exact database.
Access to a specific target command sequences are verified throughout uplink plan and sequence generation phases.
Criteria
High (3) Medium (2) Low (1) Reproduceability
Attacker randomly retrieve and edit data, usually support data are human readable.
Exploitability
Requires some mission domain knowledge to make sense of support data.
Discoverability
Support data are part of mission system, however, finding the uplink support data has small chance than finding any type of support data.
Criteria
High (3) Medium (2) Low (1) Reproduceability Attacker has to go through the attack vector the same way again.
.
Exploitability
Requires some mission domain knowledge to find correct input data.
Discoverability
Uplink tools are a small set of software in an entire ground data system.
F.

Impact Analysis
This step in measuring level of risk is to determine the adverse impact resulting from a successful threat exercise of vulnerability. In the DREAD model [8] above, mission impact is described in terms of "Damage Potential" and "Affected Entity". Through the course of this study these impact statements was modified to better suit the present assessment, which are ranked from High (H), Medium (M), and Low (L) with a score 3, 2, and 1 respectively. 
G. Risk Determination
The metrics and calculations determining risk described in this section are used to estimate the likelihood of a successful attack by a threat agent and the effect of that attack on the mission (impact). Such risks to the mission can be calculated using the standard risk formula [3, 9] :
Level of Risk = Attack Success Likelihood (ASL) x Mission Impact (MI)
Uplink system risk determination calculated from the Level of Risk formula:
• Tampering A. Mitigation #1 (M1): o Strengthen perimeter security control to mission and science operation centers by multi-level sign authentication with multi-level security policy enforcement [1] .
o Increase data confidentiality and integrity securities by data encryption and multi-factor security control to command data store [2] .
o Perform forward and reverse command validations. o Strengthen commanding process and reviews by cross-examinations.
B. Mitigation #2 (M2):
o Strengthen perimeter security control to mission and science operation centers by multi-level sign authentication with multi-level security policy enforcement. o Increase data confidentiality and integrity securities by data encryption and multi-factor security control to mission data store. o Perform data verification at each node in uplink process value chain.
In general, MOS should continue to be vigilant to security threats. Establish vigorous process for user credentials management, to avoid account decommissions negligence and duplication of user credential stores. Infuse of new security technologies. Work with FFRDCs NASA centers, and other external organizations in determining cyber security threats and mitigation strategies. Apply cyber security knowledge learned from MOS experience to continuously improve cyber security protection to NASA missions.
The most important recommendation is to include cyber threat risk assessments and security system engineering throughout the MOS development cycle concurrent with system fault protection system design. Otherwise, it is impossible to design a dependable and reliable MOS to meet today's rapid changing cyber threat environment.
